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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade many nations in the Third World have challenged the Western 
democratic notion of a free press. Critics have argued that rather than act as a negative 
check on government, the press should act as a positive reinforcement of development. 
Nigeria, which through decades has been said to have one of the freest presses in the 
Third World, provides an interesting example of the critical issues facing journalists and 
legal scholars in non-Western nations. Throughout its experiences under colonial, dem-
ocratic, and military rule, the press in this West African country has acted as a critic of 
the existing regime in the tradition of Western media. Although this did not mean that 
the press was unchecked and that the existing government did not tamper with press 
freedom, the basic definition or role of the Nigerian press, nevertheless, was never 
directly challenged. From December 31, 1983 through August 27, 1985, however, Ni-
geria was ruled by a military junta headed by Major General Mohammadu Buhari. Faced 
with serious economic woes and social unrest which threatened the stability of the 
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country, General Buhari and his ruling Supreme Military Council (SMC) attempted to 
exercise heavy handed control over numerous aspects of the Nigerian society including 
the heretofore free press. Among the SMC's decrees, Decree No.4 was intended to stifle 
the traditionally vigorous criticism by the press of the government. Along with Decree 
No.4, there was also an effort by the Buhari regime to change the Western orientation 
of the press to one reflecting a "developmental journalism" perspective. 
This paper will focus on the role of the press in a free society vis-a-vis a government 
controlled or developmental press. Our immediate case study will be Nigeria where the 
Buhari regime made serious efforts to completely redefine the purpose of the press. 
Inherent in our discussion will be the consideration of the issue of whether or not 
Western models of a free press should be imposed on developing or Third World 
societies. 
II. PRESS FREEDOM IN NIGERIA: 1850-1983 
There is a long standing history of press freedom in Nigeria. This freedom has 
been manifested in two important ways. First, the print press in the country has been 
diversified and generally privately owned. l Second, reporters for Nigerian newspapers 
and magazines have been relatively free to comment on the affairs of government even 
to the point of negative criticism.2 In fact, before 1983 one long-term African observer 
suggested that the press in Nigeria was probably Africa's freest. 3 
A. The Colonial Period: 1850-1959 
The British first arrived in what is now modern Nigeria in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In 1914, when the British consolidated the various regions under a central 
authority, a system of indirect rule was introduced under which the British governed 
through so-called "traditional rulers," many of whom were "traditional" only because 
the British designated them to be so. From then until independence in 1960, the British 
had considerable difficulty in deciding whether Nigeria should really be treated as one 
country or three separate regions. These tensions were aggravated with independence 
and eventually produced the bloody Biafran War which lasted from 1967 to 1969. The 
war seems to have settled once and for all that Nigeria will henceforth be governed as 
one nation and since that time the various regions and ethnic groups have made a 
genuine effort to co-exist peaceably. Differences, however, still exist. 
Each of the successive constitutions imposed upon Nigeria during the colonial period 
by Britain introduced greater participation by native blacks in the government. This 
level of participation, however, was never allowed to approach even remotely the self-
governance e~oyed by the American colonies at the time of their struggle for indepen-
dence in 1776.' 
Throughout the colonial period, Nigeria, at least in Lagos and the cities of the south, 
had an extremely active and critical press.5 The role of and the limits on the press were 
1 F.I.A. OMU, PRESS AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA 171 (1978). 
2 D. LAMB, THE AFRICANS 246 (1982). 
3Id. at 254. 
4 Nigeria's experiences with democracy are chronicled in Seng, Democracy in Nigeria, 9 BLACK 
L. REv. (UCLA) 113 (1985). 
5 See F. OMU, supra note l. 
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largely defined by British precedents - although it would be a mistake to assume that 
Nigerians enjoyed the same freedom to comment as was enjoyed in Britain.6 Perhaps 
the chief restraint on the press was the British common law of libel. Indeed the payment 
of fines for libelous publications seems to have been a regular expenditure for most 
publishers.7 In 1903, an ordinance was enacted in Lagos to require all newspapers to 
register with the government and to post a bond for 250 pounds as surety against any 
penalties imposed for publishing any blasphemous, seditious or other libeLS Today libel 
actions are still a major check on the excesses of the Nigerian press.9 For instance, in 
1984, a high court judge in Lagos found that the novel The Man Died by Wole Soyinka 
libeled a commissioner of the former military government and ordered the book to be 
banned. 10 
In 1909, the government passed a seditious offenses ordinance which made it a 
crime to publish any statement bringing or attempting to bring the government into 
hatred or contempt or which incited or tried to incite dissatisfaction, disloyalty or feelings 
of enmity towards the government or different classes of the population in southern 
Nigeria.1I There were three prosecutions under this ordinance in the first quarter-
century following its passage. 12 In what was perhaps the most sensational press case 
during the colonial era, Herbert Macaulay, the leading black political leader of his day, 
was sentenced to six months imprisonment for seditious libel. Macaulay was found to 
have published a rumor that there was a plot to assassinate one of the deposed and 
banished traditional rulers.,g 
One of the final contributions of the British to civil liberties in Nigeria was a bill of 
rights which went into effect in 1959 and which has remained in effect with minor 
modifications to the present. 14 While not expressly mentioning the word "press," the 
document did guarantee freedom of conscience,'5 freedom of expression, 16 and the right 
to peaceful assembly and association. '7 These rights were qualified by the specific limi-
tation that they did not "invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health."'8 
B. The First Republic: 1960-1965 
Independence in 1960 brought with it all the trappings of a British-style parliamen-
tary democracy.'9 The period of this First Republic was marked by considerable tension 
6 F. OMU, supra note 1, at 12-13. 
'F. OMU, supra note 1, at 79-80. 
8 Newspaper Ordinance No. 10 of 1903; reenacted as Ordinance No. 40 (1917). See F. OMU, 
supra note 1, at 180. 
9 See T.O. ELIAS, NIGERIAN PRESS LAW 16-35 (1969). 
10 National Concord, Feb. 2, 1984, at 9, col. 5. 
11 F. OMU, supra note I, at 184; see also T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 67-87. 
12 F. OMU, supra note 1, at 188. 
"[d. at 195-96. 
14 Sixth Schedule, inserted to Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1954 (1959). 
"[d. at § 7. 
16 [d. at § 8. 
17 [d. at § 9. 
18 [d. at §§ 7(4)(a), 8(2)(a), and 9(2)(a). 
19 Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria §§ 33,36, and 78 (1960). 
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between the various regions and ethnic groups who were jockeying for power. Although 
the Constitution explicitly gave the courts jurisdiction to redress the deprivation of 
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution,20 the judiciary proceeded cautiously.21 
The Supreme Court gave an extremely restrictive interpretation to press freedom 
in its 1961 decision in Director of Public Prosecution v. Chike Obi.22 Chike Obi was convicted 
for distributing a pamphlet containing the following exhortations: 
Down with the enemies of the people, the exploiters of the weak and op-
pressors of the poor! ... The days of those who have enriched themselves 
at the expense of the poor are numbered. The common man in Nigeria can 
today no longer be fooled by sweet talk at election time only to be exploited 
and treated like dirt after the booty of office has been shared among the 
politicians .... 23 
A colonial statute passed during World War II had made it unlawful to publish any 
statements which contained a seditious intent.24 The Supreme Court sustained Chike 
Obi's conviction. The opinion of Chief Justice Ademola stated that the statute made it 
illegal "to use words expressive of an intention to effect the purpose of exciting a state 
of ill feeling against the Government."25 The Justice emphasized that a statement was 
not seditious if it only pointed out errors or defects in the government. But a statement 
could be unlawful even though it did not incite the public to violence: "What is not 
permitted is to criticize the government in a malignant manner ... , for such attacks by 
their nature tend to affect the public peace."26 
The continuing applicability of the Chike Obi reasoning was questioned by the Court 
of Appeals of Anambra State in 1983.27 Chief Arthur Nwankwo was convicted of sedition 
for publishing a book critical of the Governor of Anambra State. The trial court sen-
tenced him to twelve months imprisonment with hard labor and banned the publication 
of the book. Furthermore, the court warned persons who had purchased the book to 
20 Constitution § 31 (1960); Constitution § 32 (1963). 
21 See A.B. KASUNMU, THE SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA 107-32 (1977). 
22 [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 186. 
23Id. at 189. 
24 Criminal Code § 41(1)(c) (Laws of Nigeria, 1958, vol. II, col. 42). 
A "seditious intent" was defined as an intention: 
(a) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite dissatisfaction against the 
person of Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, or the person of the Governor-
General or the Governor of a Region, or the Government or Constitution of the 
United Kingdom, or of Nigeria, or of any region thereof, as by an established or 
against the administration of justice in Nigeria; or 
(b) to excite Her Majesty's subjects or inhabitants of Nigeria to attempt to 
procure the alteration, otherwise than by lawful means, of any other matter in 
Nigeria as by law established; or 
(c) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst Her Majesty's subjects or in-
habitants of Nigeria; or 
(d) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of the 
population of Nigeria. 
25 Chike Obi, 1 All N.L.R. at 192. 
26Id. at 194. It should also be noted that in 1962 three men were convicted for writing articles 
about political corruption in the Western Region. B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
EMERGENT STATES 62 (1973). 
27 Chief Arthur Nwankwo v. The State, FCAlE/111183 (Fed. Ct. App.: Enugu, 7/27/83), reprinted 
in A. NWANKWO, JUSTICE 160 (1983). 
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surrender their copies at the nearest police station. A unanimous court of appeals 
reversed the conviction. The justices were of the view that the law of sedition as applied 
to Chike Obi derogated from the freedom of speech guaranteed in the 1979 Constitu-
tion.28 
In 1962, parliament passed an official secrets act making it an offense to transmit 
any matter designated by the government to be "classified." The law gave extremely 
broad discretion to the government in classifying information. 29 
However, perhaps the most controversial law passed during the First Republic 
relating to free speech was the Newspapers (Amendment) Act of 1964.30 This act, inter 
alia, prohibited any person from publishing in any newspaper a statement, rumor, or 
report, knowing or having reason to believe that the statement, rumor or report was 
false. 31 The law provided that it was no defense for the person to assert that he did not 
know or did not have reason to know that the statement was false unless he proved that 
prior to publication he took reasonable measures to verify the accuracy of the statement. 32 
The law, however, was apparently never enforced directly against any journalist.33 
During the period between the general election of 1964 and the military coup in 
January 1966, a number of local governments passed laws banning designated newspa-
pers because of their criticism of the local governments.34 One of the first acts of the 
military following the 1966 coup was to invalidate these restrictions and allow the free 
distribution of newspapers throughout the country.35 
C. Military Rule: 1966-1979 
The military took over the government of Nigeria in 1966 and ruled until 1979 
when it voluntarily handed the government back to the civilians pursuant to an Ameri-
can-style democracy. During the military period, Nigeria experienced the bloody Biafran 
War. The war was followed by a boom in the price of oil, of which Nigeria had a plentiful 
supply. In the 1970's, Nigeria embarked on a building and modernization program 
unprecedented in the country's history. Although there were several counter-coups and 
corruption and mismanagement flourished, the general perception of Nigerians today 
is that the decade of the 1970's was in many ways a golden age. 
The military government continued to recognize the fundamental rights provisions 
of the 1963 Constitution36 and affirmatively protected the press by lifting the ban on 
newspapers imposed by many of the civilian governments during the First Republic. 
Further, the government made it a criminal offense for anyone to prevent or restrict 
28Id. 
29 Official Secrets Act, 1962, No. 29, § 1. See T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 39-45. 
30 Newspaper (Amendments) Act, 1964, No. V. 
31Id. at § 4(1). 
32Id. at § 4(2). 
33 The Democrat Weekly, May 6, 1984, at 5, col. 1. It has been argued that the Newspaper 
(Amendments) Act cowed the press sufficiently so as to prevent reporters from giving effective 
coverage to the rigging of the 1964 election. B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT 
STATES 152 (1973). 
34 T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 133. It should also be noted that most newspapers were either 
owned by or financed by various governments or political parties. B.O. NWABUEZE, supra note 33. 
35 Decree No.2 (The Circulation of Newspapers Decree) (1966). 
36 Decree No.1 (Constitutional Suspension and Modification) (1966). 
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the sale or distribution of newspapers.~7 In June 1966, however, the Supreme Military 
Council promulgated Decree No. 44 which made it an offense for anyone to provoke a 
breach of the peace by a defamatory or offensive publication.~8 In an interview in 1967, 
Major-General Yakubu Gowan, the Head of the Federal Military Government, com-
mented that: 
I cannot tell them what to do since we do not dictate policy to any press 
here; they have been independent as they ought to be. The press has to tell 
the truth, to be objective and honest so that the people can rely on what they 
print. They should tell us off when they feel we are wrong and commend 
when they feel it is worthwhile: We can take it.~9 
Despite these comments, Gowan signed Decree No. 17 of 1967, which gave the head of 
the military government power to prohibit the circulation of any newspaper it felt was 
detrimental to the interests of the Federation or of any State.40 
Perhaps the most celebrated free press issue arose in the so-called Amakiri Affair.'1 
Amakiri, a newspaper reporter who was arrested by one of the state governors, was 
beaten and had his head shaved with a dull knife. A high court awarded Amakiri a total 
of 10,000 naira for the beating, the detention, and the pain inflicted upon him. 
In 1978, the military government announced its intention to create a press council 
to supervise and control news reporting. The decree was never implemented because of 
opposition from the press and public.42 It was during this military rule that the federal 
government purchased controlling interest in the Daily Times, black Africa's highest 
circulation daily, and the New Nigerian, the leading newspaper in the north.4~ During 
the thirteen years of military rule, it was said that the arbitrary detention of journalists 
became a standard occupational hazard.44 
D. The Second Republic: 1979-1983 
The 1979 Constitution which ushered in the Second Republic provided that "every 
person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions 
and to receive and import ideas and information without interference."45 The Consti-
tution also contained a new Chapter II which was patterned on the Indian Constitution.46 
This chapter set forth the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy. 
Specifically, Chapter II noted that the press, radio, television, and other agencies of the 
mass media were to be free to uphold the fundamental objectives of that chapter and 
37 Decree No.2 (The Circulation of Newspapers Decree) (1966). 
38 Decree No. 44 (The Defamatory and Offensive Publications Decree) (1966). 
39 Reprinted in T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 129. 
40 Decree No. 17 (Newspapers-Prohibition of Circulation Decree) (1967). 
41 See JAKANDE, THE PRESS AND MILITARY RULE, IN NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS UNDER 
MILITARY RULE 110-23 (0. Oyediran ed. 1979). 
42 See T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 130-32; O. ODETOLA, MILITARY REGIMES AND DEVELOPMENT 
154 (1982). 
43 See D. WILCOX, BLACK AFRICAN STATES IN PRESS CONTROL AROUND THE WORLD 210 (Curry 
& Dassen ed. 1982); NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 222 (4th ed. 1982). 
44 D. WILCOX, supra note 43, at 223. 
45 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 36(1) (1979). 
46 India Const. p. IV (1949); D. BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 132-40 
(8th ed. 1980). 
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to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government to the people.47 While 
the Constitution explicitly provided that no court could declare any executive or legis-
lative act illegal because it did not conform to the principles set out in Chapter 11,48 the 
courts did hold that Chapter II could be used as a guide when interpreting the policy 
objectives of legislative enactments and other provisions of the Constitution.49 
When the civilians took over in 1979, however, the majority parties quickly sought 
to consolidate their power by stifling their opposition. Shortly after the elections, the 
federal government quietly suggested a change of editor and staff for the government 
owned Daily Times, which had published stories commenting on the salaries of the new 
government officials. 50 The detention of journalists continued, although most of the 
abuses seem to have been on the state level.51 The offices of the Nigeria Standard were 
ransacked by police looking for "vital documents," and the editor of the Sunday Standard 
was beaten by a state legislator. 52 
Nonetheless, during this period, the courts seemed to have become more comfort-
able with their role as a check on government excesses. In Momoh v. Senate of the National 
Assembly,53 the High Court of Lagos State upheld the claim of a newsman that he was 
privileged from testifying before a Senate investigating committee. A reporter wrote an 
editorial on corruption and influence peddling in the legislature, and a committee was 
convened by the Senate to investigate the matter. The High Court noted: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that those who express their opinions, 
or impart ideas and information through the medium of a newspaper or 
any other medium for the dissemination of information enjoy by customary 
law and convention a degree of confidentiality. How else is a disseminator 
of information to operate if those who supply him with such information are 
not assured of protection from identification or disclosure? ... Is there any 
doubt in anybody's mind, that the 49 wise men who formulated the Consti-
tution of the Country were conscious of the unsavory consequences attendant 
on any attempt to deafen the public by preventing or hindering the free 
flow of information, news and/or ideas from them. This perhaps explains 
the reason why the provision of Section 36(1) gives freedom of expression 
subject only to the laws of the Country as to libel, slander, injurious falsehood, 
etc. Even where such a matter arises it would be a matter for a court of law 
to determine and not the legislature.54 
The 1979 Constitution specifically provided that no person, other than the state or 
federal government or any other person authorized by the President, could own, establish 
or operate a television or radio station. 55 As a result of this arrangement, it often seemed 
47 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 21 (1979). 
48 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 6(b)(c) (1979). 
49 Archbishop Okogie v. Attorney Gen. of Lagos State, [1981] 2 N.C.L.R. 337, 350 (Fed. Ct. 
App. Lagos). 
50 D. WILCOX, supra note 43, at 221. 
51 [d. at 224. 
52 [d. at 225. 
"[1981]1 N.C.L.R. 105 (High Ct.: Lagos) (1981). 
54 [d. at 113-14. In a similar situation, another High Court ruled that the police could not 
compel a reporter to disclose the source of his information. Oluhola Oyegbemi v. Attorney General, 
[1982] 3 N.C.L.R. 895 (High Ct.: Ikeja). 
55 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 36(s) (1979). 
92 BOSTON COllEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:85 
that the National Television Authority operated primarily as a propaganda organ of the 
NPN, the ruling party on the national level, and that the state networks promulgated 
the views of the party in control of the state. At one point, a television newscaster in 
Anambra State walked out in the middle of a newscast. He announced to the audience, 
"I am sorry. I cannot with my conscience continue to read this news full of falsehood. I 
hereby resign my appointment with immediate effect." Confusion reigned for five min-
utes, until someone from the station took over and apologized to the viewers.56 
III. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR NIGERIAN PRESS FREEDOM: 1850-1983 
In terms of freedom of the press, some of the press gag measures employed by the 
post-colonial Nigerian governments would have clearly been unconstitutional under 
standards enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. However, none of these 
measures seemed to question the fundamental role of the press as developed in Western 
democratic societies. During the Colonial period it was at least officially recognized that 
the colonial governments had to act in accordance with the law and the traditional 
notions of British justice.57 The Bill of Rights inserted into the Nigerian Constitution in 
1959 was patterned after the European Convention on Human Rights. Similarly, the law 
of libel was directly imported from the English common law. The Nigerian Official 
Secrets Act was actually drafted more precisely than its English counterpart. 58 The law 
of seditious libel was well known at common law and was not a totally foreign issue in 
the early history of the United States. 59 Even today the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that the first amendment does not prevent the government from acting 
to prevent serious breaches of the peace.60 Nigeria has thus seemed to embrace without 
serious questioning the Western democratic view of a free press. This Western view of 
a "free press" accepts at least five roles for the press.61 
1) The Press as a Medium of Information and Enlightenment. A primary role of the 
press is to provide information, entertainment, and education to its readers, listeners, 
or viewers. The concept of "news," to actually publish information, is the function that 
unites all media. The standard by which each representative medium is judged often 
involves its credibility in publishing information in a timely and accurate fashion. 
2) The Press as an Example of Private Ownership in Capitalistic Societies. In the United 
States the media, both the print and the electronic, are organized for profit. Further, 
large conglomerates with properties that cross media (e.g., magazines, radio stations, 
television networks, and book publishing houses) are readily discernible in most parts of 
the country. In other Western democracies, private ownership of the print media is also 
widespread. However, outside of the United States only twenty percent of the electronic 
56 Chicago Tribune, July 31, 1983, at 6, col. 3. 
57 Eshugbayi Eleko v. The Officer Administering the Government of Nigeria [1931] A.C. 662. 
58 English Official Secrets Acts, 1911, § 2(1). See T.O. ELIAS, supra note 9, at 41. 
59 See L.W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985); J.M. SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS (1956). 
60 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916, 927 (1982); Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
61 See, e.g., W.K. AGEE, THE PRESS AND PUBLIC INTEREST (1968); H.J. ALTSCHULL, AGENTS OF 
POWER: THE ROLE OF THE NEWS MEDIA IN HUMAN AFFAIRS (1984); E. EMERY, THE PRESS AND 
AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATIVE HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA (3d ed. 1972); J.L. HULTENG, THE 
FOURTH ESTATE: AN INFORMAL ApPRAISAL OF THE NEWS AND OPINION MEDIA (2d ed. 1983). 
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media organizations are privately owned.62 Because of this private ownership, the as-
sumption is that media can be free from governmental influences and control. In Nigeria, 
while the government owned the electronic media and the two major newspapers, there 
still existed a large number of privately owned newspapers. More notably, both the 
privately and the publicly owned newspapers represented a broad spectrum of opinion. 63 
3) The Press as a "Watchdog." Embedded in the democratic ideal is the inherent 
conflict between the "people's right to know" and government's tendency to protect 
information from public scrutiny.64 The debate involving such issues as the Freedom of 
Information Act and reporters' shield laws continually redefines the parameters of this 
conflict. The watchdog role of the press is based on the assumption that, in a democracy, 
there must be a full and vigorous debate of public issues. Justice William O. Douglas's 
dissent in Dennis v. United States makes the point that: 
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion 
exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion keeps 
a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains 
that work to tear all civilizations apart.65 
Thus, democracies charge the mass media with the responsibility of ferreting out pre-
viously controlled information and projecting it into the public arena for discussion. 
While this watchdog role often causes an uneasy truce between the media and govern-
ment, the democratic ideal assumes that both are part of the system, each having a 
separate but vital role to fulfill. 
The "watchdog" role of the press was specifically recognized in the 1979 Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Chapter II noted that the press was one of the 
primary vehicles for upholding the responsibility and accountability of the government 
to the people.66 
4) The Press as a Diversified Entity. Because each medium must be audience-
oriented to be able to market its product, in democratic societies a highly diversified 
media develops, each one aiming at a slightly different share of the market than its 
competitor. The ideal would be such diversification that all viewpoints, regardless of how 
extreme or unpopular, have an outlet. In theory, the United States has the widest ranging 
media, in terms of news content and editorial position, of any country in the world. Yet, 
because of the influence of media giants such as Capital Cities Communications, Times-
Mirror, the Washington Post Co., and Rupert Murdoch, such diversity might be some-
what less than ideally conceived. Despite some government ownership in Nigeria the 
press remained diversified.67 
5) The Press as Profit Motivated. Ultimately, all media must compete in the eco-
nomic marketplace. Therefore, audited circulation rates and television ratings play an 
important role in determining the financial success of a media organization. In the 
United States, the history has been that the government plays no role in financing the 
media. Newspapers are allowed to fail, even in communities with only one surviving 
62 Machado, Is Development News?, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON NEWS 15 (L. Atwood, 
S.J. Bulion, & S.M. Murphy ed. 1982). 
63 NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 43, at 222-23. 
64 S.M. CUTLIP & A.H. CENTER, EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS 500 (5th ed. 1982). 
65 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
66 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 21 (1979). 
67 See supra note 63. 
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editorial voice. In other Western democracies, Sweden and France, for example, news-
papers often receive large subsidies from the government.68 In Paris, the French gov-
ernment underwrites a huge operating loss to keep the leftist LeMonde in business. The 
difficulty with these subsidies is that in these countries it clouds the issue of what 
"privately owned" means. The press' role as watchdog and its ability to survive econom-
ically could create conflicts. 
The traditional view of the profit nature of the press holds that a compromise can 
usually be negotiated between the desire to develop revenue through advertising and 
the need to retain editorial integrity. The assumption is that managers can be free to 
make decisions without interference from those with financial concerns. The system 
creates mixed results, often functioning well, other times performing below expectations. 
Thus, the Nigerian press generally fell within the mainstream of these five consid-
erations. The threat of a libel suit or of detention may have checked some media excesses, 
but, for the most part, the Western ideal was not seriously challenged by the post-colonial 
governments. Reporting was robust and sometimes resembled the morbid sensationalism 
so prevalent in the journalism which flourished in the United States in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. 
IV. TOWARDS A NEW ROLE FOR THE PRESS IN NIGERIA? 
Whether the Nigerian press should follow the Western model for the media was 
seriously questioned in late 1983 when the military overthrew the Second Republic. In 
his maiden broadcast to the nation on January 2, 1984, the new head of state, General 
Mohammadu Buhari, cited the country's continuing economic ills, as well as the un-
precedented corruption which was allowed to occur during the civilian rule as the major 
reasons for the COUp.69 As when the military took over in 1966, it promptly suspended 
important aspects of the Constitution but retained those provisions which protected 
fundamental rights and defined the basic objectives of the government. 70 
In a speech on January 5,1984, General Buhari appealed to the press to report the 
activities of the Federal Military Government with accuracy. He noted that "we cannot 
stop you from publishing, but please anything you publish about us let it be accurate."71 
Nonetheless, statements of officials in the new military regime showed that the govern-
ment was groping to redefine the nature of the press to conform with development 
needs. On January 21, 1984, Chief of Staff Tunde Idiagbon criticized the press for not 
giving "positive guidance to the nation."72 He suggested that recent stories had demon-
strated "a lack of understanding, even lack of sympathy for the objectives of the gov-
ernment which you hailed only two weeks ago."73 Statements of various state military 
governors also evidenced a "developmental" journalism perspective. The governor of 
Oyo State noted that the governments and journalists should work hand in hand because 
"they are partners in progress,"74 and the governor of Imo State declared that "all media 
68 Kelly, Access Denied the Politics of Press Censorship, THE WASHINGTON PAPER (Washington, D.C.: 
The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978). 
69 The Nigerian Standard, Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 2. 
70 Decree No.1 - Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (1984). 
71 New Nigerian, Jan. 5, 1984, at 1, col. 3. 
72 Daily Times, Jan. 21,1984, at 1, col. 3. 
73 [d. 
74 The National Concord, Jan. 23, 1984, at 9, col. 5. 
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should now join hands and assist the government in creating and sustaining the new 
order of purpose and productive living."75 The governor of Lagos State also suggested 
that new reporters be re-orientated to the dissemination of information to build an 
improved image of Nigeria.76 At a press conference in February, General Buhari lashed 
out at the press and said that he was going to "tamper" with the press freedoms enshrined 
in the 1979 Constitution. He referred with anger to articles in the press which had 
claimed that 2.8 million naira had been found missing in the oil ministry while he headed 
that agency in the late 1970's.77 
On March 29, 1984, the Federal Military Government promulgated Decree No.4, 
which punished any person who published 
in any form, whether written or otherwise, any message, rumor, report or 
statement which is false in any material particular or which brings or is 
calculated to bring the Federal Military Government or the Government of 
a state or a public officer to ridicule or disrepute.78 
The burden of proving whether "the message, rumor, report or statement which is the 
subject matter of the charge is true, in every material particular" was placed on the 
person charged.79 Offenses were to be tried by a special tribunal, the chairman of which 
would be a judge, while the three other members were to be officers of the armed forces 
not below the rank of a major.80 A person convicted under the decree could be impris-
oned for up to four years and a corporation could be fined not less than 10,000 naira. 
The equipment used to commit the offense could be forfeited to the Federal Military 
Government.81 Judicial review was prohibited.82 
On June 2, 1984, the Guardian, a privately owned newspaper published in Lagos, 
and two of its reporters were summoned to appear before the tribunal established 
pursuant to Decree No.4. The reporters were alleged to have published false information 
concerning certain embassy assignments about to be made by the Federal Military Gov-
ernment.8S The Guardian, through its reporters, had reported that eleven missions were 
to be closed, that eight military chiefs had been picked as ambassadors, and that Haruna 
was to replace Hannanuya as envoy to the United Kingdom. The reporters were detained 
and the tribunal ruled that it had no power to release them on bail.84 Counsel for the 
defense argued that the decree required that the statement had not only to be untrue, 
but also to bring the government or officer to ridicule and disrepute. The tribunal, 
however, ruled that the decree created two separate offenses. A person could be punished 
either if he published an untrue statement or if he published a true statement which 
brought the government or officer to ridicule and disrepute.85 The paper and its re-
75 Daily Times, Jan. 31, 1984, at 18, col. 1. 
76 National Concord, Mar. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 2. 
77 National Concord, Feb. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 1. Articles had also appeared in various newspapers 
which disclosed the value of Buhari's residence and other financial interests. 
78 Decree No.4 - Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusations) Decree (1984), § 1. 
79 [d. at § 3(1). 
80 [d. at § 3(4). 
81 [d. at § 8(1) and (3). 
82 [d. at § 8(4). 
85 The Guardian, June 6, 1984, at 2, col. 3. 
84 [d. at 1, col. 3. 
85 The Guardian, June 16, 1984, at 1, col. 1. 
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porters were later convicted on one of the three charges alleged against them. The 
tribunal found only the third statement concerning the identity of the envoy to the 
United Kingdom to be inaccurate, but it sentenced the reporters to one year each in 
prison and fined the Guardian 50,000 naira.86 
Generally, however, the Nigerian press was able to freely criticize Decree No.4 and 
the other actions taken by the government to curb press excesses. Indeed, in an interview 
inJuly, 1985, Professor Wole Soyinka commented on how the news media continued to 
print stories on a daily basis "about the injustice of keeping people in prison without 
their being tried. You will read everyday about double, triple, and multiple standards 
of justice which are so blatantly evident."87 His criticism of the government was not that 
it was suppressing such stories but that it was deaf to this criticism. 
Still, Decree No.4 was not the only means the government used to curtail the press. 
The detention of journalists continued,88 and a number of journalists lost their jobs.89 
The government established measures to bar the free flow of information to the press90 
and put curbs on interviews between public officers and reporters. 91 The idea of a 
government sponsored press council was also reintroduced.92 
Some of the measures taken by the military government appeared to be at odds 
with one another. For instance, the government constantly stressed the need for reporters 
to strive for accuracy in their reporting, but then closed the doors to reporters when 
they tried to verify stories.93 Nonetheless, these measures alone did not signal a new role 
for the press. Decree No.4, although it provided for a trial by a tribunal, was otherwise 
within the tradition of the older sedition laws and the Newspaper (Amendment) Act of 
86 New Nigerian, July 5,1984, at 1, col. 2; West Africa,July 9,1984, at 1415, col. l. 
87 The Punch, July 24, 1985, at 1, col. 2. 
88 The Guardian noted the detention without charges of the editorial consultant of The Punch, 
the visit (in the middle of the night) of nine military police to the home of the editor of Nigerian 
Tribune, and the beating of a cameraman of the Punch by soldiers. The Guardian, Apr. 15, 1984, 
at 4, col. 1. On June 25, 1984, the Daily Times reported the arrest of one of its photographers who 
photographed a military band which was playing at a privately owned university in Imo State. Daily 
Times, June 25, 1984, at 32, col. 4. Two days later the paper reported that the photographer had 
been set free. Daily Times, June 27, 1984, at 32, col. l. 
89 Three journalists were terminated by the Imo State government for alleged anti-government 
bias. National Concord, Mar. 19, 1984, at 17, col. l. The National Television Authority removed 
reporters whose faces were too closely associated with the prior regime. National Concord, Mar. 
10, 1984, at 13, col. 5. The Statesman was closed for two months and two reporters were dismissed 
who wrote a story questioning the differences in the conditions of detention of the former president 
and vice-president. International Herald Tribune, May 3, 1984, at 2, col. l. 
90 National Concord, July 3, 1984, at 1, col. 1; The Guardian, Apr. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 3. 
91 The Guardian reported that two state information officers were jailed over a report which 
originated in their office that teachers had won a bigger pay packet. The Guardian, Jan. 27, 1984, 
at 14, col. l. In May of 1984, the federal military government issued a circular to public servants 
forbidding them from talking to the press without clearance from their bosses. National Concord, 
May 5, 1984, at 24, col. 2. However, in an interview reported on July 26, 1984, the Chief Secretary 
for the Federal Military Council denied that the government had forbidden university teachers 
from talking to newsmen. The Punch, July 26, 1985, at 16, col. 6. The same newspaper contained 
a story concerning twenty-four inmates who had died in the Abeokuta prisons in the past four 
months. The article ended by noting that the controller of the prison declined comment saying 
"you should be aware that public officers have been banned from granting interviews." The Punch, 
July 26, 1985, at 16, col. 3. 
92 National Concord, June 12, 1984, at 9, col. 2. 
93 National Concord,July 3,1984, at 1, col. 1; The Guardian, Apr. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 3. 
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1964.94 Journalists had also been subjected to detention and removal under the previous 
military and civilian regimes.95 
The federal Minister of Information, while emphasizing that the military govern-
ment did not intend to interfere with the right of the press to publish the truth, stated 
in a speech to the new board of directors of the New Nigerian that Nigerian newspapers 
have: 
a basic duty to perform in ensuring the peace, unity, progress and stability 
of this country. All other interests, serious, business, or mundane, must be 
subordinated to this basic duty. To accomplish this goal, it is the primary 
duty of your newspapers to strain all nerves in interpreting, explaining, 
analyzing, debating, assessing and offering suitable alternatives to govern-
ment policies and objectives. Our nation is too young for her newspapers to 
indulge in destructive sensationalism, deliberate mischief and purposeless 
slants which will only set us back from the path of progress and develop-
ment.96 
Furthermore, the Attorney General, Mr. Chike Ofodile, in the course of a spirited 
defense of Decree No.4, commented that while American journalists could be free to 
speculate as they did in the course of the Watergate scandal, Nigeria was not yet ripe 
for such reporting. He noted that Nigerianjournalists did not have the right to speculate 
to the extent of damaging the character of public officers.97 These comments by public 
officers were not without effect. When the Federal Military Government announced a 
War Against Indiscipline (WAI) in Nigerian society, the press immediately accepted an 
important role in creating awareness of and mobilizing support for the WAI.98 
In July 1985, General Buhari announced that there would be no talk of returning 
the country to civilian rule until the country was on a strong economic footing and law 
and order had been restored.99 The government also issued a strong warning that it 
would not tolerate any political debate in the country and that any violation of this ban 
would be dealt with under Decree No.2 of 1984, which allowed the Chief of Staff to 
detain violators for an indefinite period without legal proceedings. lOo 
The continued existence of the remaining privately owned newspapers in Nigeria 
was also put in jeopardy. General Buhari warned that if any private newspapers over-
stepped their bounds they would be shut down. He noted that the government would 
not allow private newspapers to publish news and views not in the public interest and 
asserted that "we will not allow irresponsible views capable of creating trouble or insta-
bility in whatever form to be published by these private newspapers."IOI Just one day 
later the Federal Military Government announced, as an economic measure, the restric-
tion of its newspaper advertising to its two federally owned newspapers. 102 
94 See supra notes 24, 30. 
95 The Guardian, Apr. 15, 1984, at 5, col. 1. 
96 New Nigerian, Aug. 8, 1984, at 7, col. 1. 
97 National Concord, May 15, 1984, at 2, col. 2. 
98 Daily Times, May 16, 1984, at 2, col. 2. 
99 The Punch, July 25,1985, at 1, col. 1; New Nigerian, July 25,1985, at 1, col. 3. 
100 New Nigerian, July 24, 1985, at 1, col. 2; The Punch, July 24, 1985, at 1, col. 3. 
101 New Nigerian, July 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1. 
102 The Punch, July 26, 1985, at 16, col. 6. It did note that once its debts were settled, the 
government might reconsider placing advertisements in private newspapers. 
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V. THE THIRD WORLD CRITIQUE OF THE WESTERN VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE PRESS 
The Buhari regime's criticism of the press, and its emphasis on the role of the press 
in assisting in development, reflected much of the criticism leveled against the Western 
ideal by Third World countries. The Western media, as well as the Western democratic 
view of the role of the media, has permeated much of the Third World. Because of the 
effectiveness of the Western media in saturating the world and influencing thought 
within certain developing societies, a growing series of criticisms have been expressed in 
recent years. These criticisms can be briefly summarized in the statements below. 
First, the Western media project a cultural bias which completely distorts their ability 
to be objective in dealing with the Third World. lo3 Ideally, the Western view of the press 
would be one in which reporters maintain great objectivity in their observations of events. 
Many critics in the Third World hold a very different position. To them, Western 
reporters bring much ideological baggage with them when covering the Third World. 
This baggage includes: a built-in bias toward democracy, a requirement to produce 
stories that "sell well" to a Western audience, a need to focus on "newsworthy" events 
such as coups, famine, or disaster, and a culturally created abhorrence of authoritarian 
regimes. This situation has become so pronounced that many Third World countries, 
who feel that they have been hurt by stories appearing in the Western media, have 
banned Western reporters completely.lo4 In fact, one American reporter who had cov-
ered Africa for ten years found himself persona non grata in so many African countries 
that his newspaper had to transfer him to Europe because he could no longer cover 
Africa effectively. 
The second criticism states that the Western media are insensitive to the concerns 
of the Third World,l°5 The general approach of the Western media in covering a large 
continent, such as Africa, is to place a reporter in one of the more "livable" cities and 
then to have that person travel the continent, perhaps visiting important countries once 
a year and unimportant countries rarely if ever. Over a period of two years, a reporter 
might spend three days in a country such as Zambia, yet, his dispatches might represent 
all of the information that his readers may receive on Zambia during the two years. 
Critics claim that with only three days in a country, and with much of that time spent 
only talking with Western diplomats in the capital city, the Western reporter could not 
possibly understand such complex issues as regionalism, tribalism, one party versus two 
party politics, development, and aspirations for economic independence. Unless the 
reporter makes an extraordinary effort to get outside the capital to speak with natives, 
he could not possibly become sensitive to genuine issues affecting the country and to 
the feelings of residents about those issues. In Zambia, with its importance as a moder-
ating force in helping to achieve peaceful change in South Africa, reporters are likely 
to appear on a semi-regular, if short-term basis. For a nation such as the Central African 
Republic or Guinea, the Western reporter will rarely even come to the country, depriving 
the Western audience of any information about these small, yet interesting countries. 
103 VOICES OF FREEDOM: A WORLD CONFERENCE OF INDEPENDENT NEWS MEDIA 19 (D. Bullen & 
H. Ryan ed. 1981). 
104 O. GANLEY and G. GANLEY, To INFORM OR TO CONTROL: THE NEW COMMUNICATION NET-
WORKS 171 (1982). 
105 D. Sussman, Mass News Media and the Third World Challenge, in INTERNATIONAL NEWS FREEDOM 
UNDER ATTACK 113. (D. Fascell ed. 1979). 
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When this occurs, the informational ministers and political leaders of these nations never 
have access to the Western audience. 
Third, the Western media control all of the important distribution networks for 
information. More importantly, the distribution leads from the First World to the Third 
World and rarely back from the Third World to the First. IOG Western news agencies, 
such as Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), and Reuters distribute the 
Western view of the Third World back to the Third World. For example, newspapers 
in Togo must depend on AFP reports, written and edited in Paris, for coverage of its 
neighbor Ivory Coast. American news magazines are readily available throughout the 
Third World. Both the Voice Of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration's World Service (BBC) broadcast news throughout the world by shortwave. All of 
these channels arguably reflect a Western cultural bias.107 
Perhaps the biggest purveyor of First World culture is American television. One can 
sit in a hotel room in Lagos and watch old American television programs being broadcast 
by the official Nigerian television service. Such programming is a "good buy" for the 
service because it cannot afford to produce a sufficient quantity of original programming 
to fill its broadcasting hours. The inherent difficulty is summarized by Sarah L. B. 
Amunugama, an African critic of Western media: 
What is significant about this fact is the potential impact of the values implied 
by this material on the developing world. Although the West produces ex-
cellent television and radio programs, for example, alternative news sources 
and feature services are available to Third World media that can provide 
media products much closer to the immediate concerns of the developing 
countries. The giant information conglomerates are geared to satisfy a mar-
ket that they themselves have created, and countries that find it difficult to 
provide even primary education fritter away their meager resources on 
television imports depicting violence and sex. Once audiences have been 
hooked on this type of programming, with its technical superiority, their 
preferences are nearly unshakable, and local media industry are forced to 
cater to Western cultivated tastes. lOB 
In their analysis of the outflow of American television programming, Ganley and 
Ganley point out that the United States is by far the largest exporter of programming 
of any country in the world. In terms of the amount of foreign programming imported, 
the United States is at the bottom of the list, surpassed only by Communist China.109 
Critics of this situation argue that the flow of the news coming into the Third World 
is basically one-way. Because of their vast economic and technical superiority, Western 
news organizations are able to dominate coverage. Further, the argument is made that 
an organization such as the BBC or Newsweek actually defines the news by deciding what 
to cover. Even a country openly opposing Western democracies, such as Ethiopia, has 
little ability to eradicate such cultural footprints because it does not have the resources 
to block transmission of the BBC or the VOA. This developing sense of impotency in 
106 O. GANLEY, supra note 104, at 176. 
107 Developmental Joumalism the Ideological Factor, THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 75 (P. 
Horton ed. 1978). 
lOB Amunugama, Communication Issues Confronting the Developing Nations in A HANDBOOK OF 
WORLD COMMUNICATIONS 59 (M. Siefer ed. 1984). 
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controlling or at least influencing the channels of communication has given rise to 
another view of the function of the media: developmental journalism. Development 
journalism is gaining a great following throughout the Third World. 
VI. DEVELOPMENTAL JOURNALISM: AN ALTERNATIVE To THE WESTERN VIEW OF THE 
ROLE OF THE PRESS 
Those who have been frustrated over the years with the inability of Third World 
countries to tell their story to Western audiences have suggested a rethinking of the role 
of the press and the function of journalism. A collection of wide ranging ideas and 
policies have been grouped under the label developmental journalism. Sean Kelly has 
offered this definition: 
... [T]hose Third World leaders who call for a new international economic 
and social order have also become increasingly aware of the value of news 
media in promoting national development. They want to use mass commu-
nications as an instrument for bringing about social change. Freedom of the 
press thus becomes, not freedom from government control, but rather the 
freedom to assist government in carrying out programs for improving eco-
nomic and social change. In societies where development is paramount 
among national priorities, the press is frequently expected to join the team 
along with everyone else. 110 
Emerging from several international conferences aimed at helping nations develop 
a "communication policy," was a call for a "new world information order" (NWIO) 
including most of the principles of developmental journalism. Often these conferences 
had the aid of consultants from the United Nation's Economic, Social and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). An international meeting called in 1980 under the auspices 
of UNESCO and chaired by the former Irish diplomat Sean MacBride echoed the calls 
for a NWIO. The document produced at the 1980 meeting was cited by the United 
States as one of the reasons why it withdrew from UNESCO in 1984. 111 Using the NWIO 
as a theoretical foundation, Third World countries have begun a series of actions aimed 
at exercising greater control of communication within their own boundaries. Among the 
actions taken are the following: (1) limiting access of Western reporters through the 
denial of visas, (2) requiring Western reporters to apply for licenses or work permits to 
report from the country, (3) limiting reentry of reporters who have written what the 
government considers negative reports, (4) forming "news agencies" for the purpose of 
distributing "official" news concerning the country, (5) preventing the publication of 
privately owned newspapers and magazines, (6) preventing Western books, magazines, 
and newspapers from entering the country, (7) developing very specific guidelines about 
what is reported in the country's own media, and (8) exercising complete editorial control 
over news broadcasts within the country as well as on the "external" services broadcast 
by shortwave to its neighbors. In several countries each script for a television or radio 
broadcast must have the approval of a Ministry of Information official. 
The Western reaction to these steps has been harsh and critical. One Western critic 
has called developmental journalism "official flackery and government-say-so journal-
110 Kelly, supra note 68, at 27. 
111 S. MAcBRIDE, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD (1980). 
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ism."112 The rebuttal of leaders in the Third World has often centered on the idea that 
development of the country must take precedence over any foreign cries for a free 
press. One argument offered against developmental journalism is that it is almost in 
total concert with the communist view of the press. Western analysts have been quick to 
point out that it is the Soviet Union that has been the greatest supporter of a call for a 
NWIO. Further, while developmental journalism advocates have heavily criticized the 
"cultural imperialism" of AP, UPI, and Reuters, they have been silent on the Russian 
news service, TASS.ll3 In fact, at the Nairobi UNESCO meeting in 1976, which was the 
first call for a news communication order, Radio Moscow took credit for the original 
document which was later to be modified as the NWIO.114 Third World leaders, however, 
have been quick to refute the suggestion that the NWIO represents a Soviet concept of 
communication. Rather, they contend that the press and government both have a mutual 
responsibility to help the country achieve its developmental goals. If this means control 
of the press, so be it.115 Thus, while the degree of Soviet influence in the NWIO remains 
a vital concern,1I6 it should not cloud the NWIO's very real contributions. The NWIO 
aims to increase the capabilities for people to communicate with one another as well as 
the abilities of those in the developing world to influence news content. Both of these 
goals are laudable. 
The most critical distinction between those nations which accept the aims of the 
NWIO and the Western nations, especially the United States, which do not generally 
accept developmental journalism, is the degree of government involvement in defining 
the content of news stories. From either a Western or a Third World perspective, editors 
and journalists may decide on their own that the policy of their publication is to promote 
positive development. What is offensive to the American notion of the media is the idea 
that the government should dictate to the press what viewpoint it must reflect. It is basic 
to press freedom in the United States that the government may not discriminate in the 
regulation of expression on the basis of the content of that expression: government 
regulations must be viewpoint neutral. ll7 Developmental journalism is thus anathema 
under the basic first amendment principles developed in the United States because 
developmental journalism attacks the basic premise that the press must be free to define 
its own goals. 
In Nigeria, much of the rhetoric used by the Buhari regime reflected the criticisms 
mouthed by proponents of the NWIO. While it is true that the regime did not focus on 
the reporting done by Western journalists in Nigeria, the continued emphasis on the 
press' role as a partner with the government in promoting development reflected a new 
view in Nigeria. The full implication of these developments for the Nigerian media are 
still unclear because on August 27, 1985, a military coup overthrew General Buhari. 
The new head of state, General Babangida, had also participated in the coup which 
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unseated the civilians in 1983 and installed General Buhari, so initial indications did not 
evidence a radical shift in leadership or in policy. liB 
In the first announcement of the coup, General Joshua Dongonyaro cited Buhari's 
rigidity and announced the release of journalists who had been arrested because the 
government wished to "uphold human rights."1I9 In its first official act, the new regime 
repealed the notorious Decree No.4 and created a twenty-six person commission to 
study the status of human rights in Nigeria. 120 On his first day in office, the new leader 
acknowledged that Decree No.4 "generated a lot of controversies" and that his regime 
would "welcome constructive criticism."121 Later, when the government was considering 
whether to accept a new loan from the International Monetary Fund, General Babangida 
invited public discussion. Newspaper reaction was against the loan and thus the govern-
ment deferred to that sentiment rather than adhering to the advice of its economists. 122 
On January 17, 1986, Babangida stated that the government would be returned to some 
type of civilian rule by October 1, 1990 and would continue in the interim to seek 
approval for its decisions from the country's citizenry.123 
Whether future regimes in Nigeria, either military or civilian, will continue to follow 
the traditional Western view of the press or will expect the press to act in partnership 
with the government is still undetermined. Each of the military rulers who assumed 
power in Nigeria's five previous coups also promised to respect human rights. For 
instance, Gowan's statements on press freedom were followed by restrictive decrees. 124 
General Buhari when he first assumed office announced that the military would respect 
the basic freedoms of all citizens. 125 The pressures on the government to better the 
standard of living for Nigerians will continue to be severe and the concerns with which 
the Buhari regime wrestled will not evaporate overnight. 126 On December 20, 1985, the 
Babangida government announced the arrest of a number of high ranking military 
officers who tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the government. 127 Thus temptations to 
force the press to present a united front with the government will continue to be strong. 
VII. THE NECESSITY FOR A NEW ROLE FOR THE PRESS IN NIGERIA? 
On the eve of Buhari's military coup in 1983, Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe in 
a small book, The Trouble with Nigeria, argued that the country was being destroyed by 
bad leadership, corruption, and inequality. On the question ofleadership, Achebe noted 
the "poverty of thought" exhibited by Nigeria's two most important post-independence 
politicians, Dr. Nnamdi Azikewe and Chief Obafemi Awolowo.I 2B The nation's leaders 
118 Again, the stated reason for the coup was corruption and a failure to correct the ailing 
economy. New York Times, Aug. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 4. 
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continually inflated Nigeria's position in the world with a "flamboyant, imaginary self-
concept."129 Achebe also criticized the false patriotism of most Nigerians. He argued that 
the country was run on the basis of patriotic slogans and that true patriotism could 
happen only "if the nation is ruled justly, if the welfare of all the people rather than the 
advantage of the few becomes the cornerstone of public policy."lso 
The issue of corruption has plagued every government in Nigeria. 1SI Corruption in 
Nigeria is not the taking of an occasional bribe. Estimates show that during the Second 
Republic the average contract was inflated as much as thirty percent due to corruptionls2 
and that about forty percent of the country's revenues were embezzled or diverted for 
corrupt political purposes. us Today Nigeria, which is a leading oil producer and poten-
tially one of the wealthiest nations in Africa, is burdened with heavy debts and has 
considered a 2.4 billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund just to stay 
afloat. IS. 
Tribalism has been the curse of Nigeria since the nation's consolidation by the 
British in 1914. Nigeria has over 300 different ethnic groups and languages. 135 It was 
tribalism that lead to the fall of the First Republic and to the disastrous Biafran War 
between 1967-1969. While Nigerians have put the war behind them and have tried to 
mitigate the effects of tribalism, it would be unrealistic to say that no vestiges remain 
today. Achebe argued that intelligent and useful discussion of tribalism is often thwarted 
by vagueness. IS6 He noted the continuing discrimination against the Igbos, the tribe 
which lost the war, especially in development projects which were not being placed in 
the Igbo region. 137 
In addition to the tribalism problem, Nigeria is also sharply divided on the lines of 
wealth, class and, most noticeably, religion. Some forty-seven percent of the population 
is Muslim, thirty-five percent Christian, and eighteen percent animist. ISS One of the 
reasons stated for the attempted coup discovered on December 20, 1985 was the discon-
tentment of Moslem officers from the North who felt that the government was dominated 
by Southerners who are mostly Christian.139 
In addition to the problems of leadership, corruption, and inequality, Nigeria has a 
rapidly expanding population which now equals nearly 100 million, and it is likely to 
reach 148 million in another fifteen years. I4O Barely one quarter of the population can 
read. 141 Like in all Third World countries, simply providing for food, shelter, and medical 
care for the population is a major concern. At the time of independence, Nigeria was a 
129 [d. at 9. 
130 [d. at 16. 
131 See generally Seng, supra note 4. 
IS2 The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 12, 1983, at 20, col. 2. 
m Nigeria: A Test for Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1983, at 44. 
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loan and was cutting military salaries as a consequence. New York Times, Dec. 21, 1985, at 3, col. 
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major exporter of food. Today, largely due to governmental policies, Nigeria imports 
large amounts of its food. 142 
Achebe describes the condition par excellence of Nigerian society as indiscipline: "a 
failure or refusal to submit one's desires and actions to the restraints of orderly social 
conduct in recognition of the rights and desires of others. The goal of indiscipline is 
self-interest; its action, the abandonment of self-restraint in pursuit of the goal."143 
Shortly after the Buhari government took control in 1984, the regime declared a "War 
Against Indiscipline." The war was fought with the newspaper articles, posters, WAI 
buttons, the so-called national pledges, and pious admonitions which are deprecated by 
Achebe. 144 
Given the problems in Nigeria, it is easy to justify governmental policies which 
promote developmental journalism. The diversity of Nigeria, the self-seeking tendencies 
of the popUlace, and the history of ethnic, cultural and religious antagonism could easily 
split the country apart. The country continually has to promote coherence and unity to 
prevent anarchy. A factious press is counterproductive. It can only aggravate Nigeria's 
problems and prevent the country from pursuing those policies necessary to move 
forward into the twenty-first century. The alternative is the dissension and violence 
which prevailed during the First Republic. l45 
On the other hand, under a government which has a policy of developmental 
journalism a critical work such as that produced by Achebe probably could not have 
been published. The book clearly portrayed Nigeria and its leaders in a bad light. If the 
plague of Nigeria, however, is indiscipline and corruption, one of the best ways to ferret 
out abuses, indeed, maybe the only way, is through such independent investigative 
journalism. It was the press that continuously complained about the appointments made 
by and the corruption in the Shagari government during the Second Republic. If the 
press did not directly contribute to the military takeover on December 31, 1983, it at 
least prepared the country for acceptance of the coup. Thus, while a free press may well 
have contributed to the instability of the civilian regime, it may have helped to put an 
end to a corrupt government. It is also difficult to imagine, at least by someone who is 
nurtured on the Western view of the press, how a democracy can function if the press 
is not free to play watchdog and if a diversity of opinion is not allowed to be represented 
in the press. The irony is, of course, that a free press may have underscored the 
weaknesses of that democracy.146 In turn, it can be argued that the overthrow of the 
Buhari regime was in part due to the restrictions it placed on the press. The lack of a 
diversified and critical press may have actually produced instability. The government 
which overthrew Buhari cited the inflexibility and isolation of his rule. 147 
Scholars of military rule have stressed that military regimes need a free and robust 
press as much as a civilian regime. l48 Because of the lack of elections and civilian input 
142 NIGERIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 43, at 144. 
143 C. ACHEBE, supra note 128, at 27. 
1441d. at 16. 
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O. BALOGUN, THE TRAGIC YEARS: NIGERIA IN CRISIS 1966-70 (1973); Oyediran, Background to 
Military Rule, in NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS UNDER MILITARY RULE 1969-71 (0. Oyediran 
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into the decision-making process, the only way the government can effectively gauge the 
public mood and the practical effect of its policies is through the press. Also because 
corruption and self-interest can exist in a military government as well as in a civilian 
government,149 the only way that these abuses can be exposed short of another military 
coup is by the press. Thus a military regime which closes off all criticism may actually 
undermine its own stability by isolating itself from the problems that really concern the 
populous and by making a future coup staged by disgruntled underlings all but inevi-
table. 
Hence the superficial view that the NWIO will promote development and stability 
may be overstated. Indeed it is not clear that the traditional restrictions imposed by 
Western democratic systems, prohibitions against false and libelous publications and 
prohibitions against publications which present a "clear and present danger" to legitimate 
governmental ends are not sufficient to insure stability and development. If the truth 
hurts, perhaps that is an indication the government needs to reexamine its positions. 
Publications that incite the violent overthrow of democratic regimes can be circum-
scribed,15o and no one would argue that military regimes do not have at least a similar 
power if not a similar right to protect themselves. The international community recog-
nizes that publications that incite racial discrimination can be circumscribed,151 and from 
this one could argue that publications which incite ethnic or religious antagonisms can 
likewise be curtailed. 152 
On balance, a press free from government control of viewpoint has served Nigeria 
well in the past. The dangers inherent in totalitarianism should warn against a radical 
restructuring of the Nigerian press at this time. 
VIII. THE JUDICIARY As A CHECK ON THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY To REDEFINE THE 
ROLE OF NIGERIAN JOURNALISM 
In the United States, although all government officers take an oath to support the 
Constitution,153 it is the judiciary which has the final say on its interpretation. 15' Hence, 
when it comes to protecting the press, it is the judiciary which stands between either 
executive or legislative attempts to curtail press freedoms. Consequently, it is normal, if 
not necessarily accurate, to equate the degree of freedom enjoyed by the press with how 
active the courts are in protecting that freedom. This is to be distinguished from the 
British legal system where, although the judiciary can check acts of the executive which 
conflict with acts of parliament or the common law, it has no power to review legislative 
acts. The role of the courts in Nigeria more closely resembles that of the United States 
than that of Britain. 155 Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the degree to which the 
149 E. NORDLINGER, SOLDIERS IN POLITICS: MILITARY COUPS AND GOVERNMENTS 127 (1977); O. 
ODETOLA, MILITARY REGIMES AND DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES 
32,34 (1982). 
150 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
15l International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 4, 
adopted Dec. 21,1965, entered into force January 4,1969,660 U.N.T.S. 195. See Jones, Article 4 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the First 
Amendment, 23 How. L.J. 429 (1980). 
152 Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
'" U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1. 
154 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
155 Lakanmi v. Attorney-General, [1971]1 U.I.L.R. 201, 218. 
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judiciary in Nigeria has historically acted as a check on either the legislative or executive 
action towards the press and what effect its decisions would have in the future should 
attempts be made to redefine the role of the press. 
The earliest courts established by the British in Nigeria were informal, but by 1863 
a Supreme Court was established in the Colony of Lagos to administer the English 
common law. The jurisdiction of this court was extended in 1900 to the Southern 
Protectorate. IS6 When Lord Lugard became governor in 1912, however, he sharply 
curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This was done at least partly because 
he saw the courts as a threat to the colonial authority.157 Nonetheless, subsequent judiciary 
acts, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1933, extended the jurisdiction of the common 
law courts throughout the country. ISS 
As a matter of law, Lord Lugard's fears were not groundless. In 1931, the British 
Privy Council held that the Nigerian Supreme Court possessed the power to review the 
actions of the colonial governors to see that they accorded with the law and the traditional 
notions of British justice. 159 In fact, however, the courts never seriously exercised this 
power. Nonetheless, as already noted,1so the colonial governments' restraints on the press 
were those which were generally recognized under British law: civil libel actions, criminal 
prosecutions for seditious libel, and the registration and licensing of newspapers. 
The 1960 Constitution, which ushered in independence, while adopting the British 
model of a parliamentary democracy also adopted the American model of the separation 
of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 161 The Constitution 
provided that any person who alleged that his fundamental rights as granted by that 
document were contravened could apply for redress to the High Court of the territory 
where the infraction occurred. 162 The courts, however, did not initially assume an activist 
role in protecting fundamental rights. As already noted, the Nigerian Supreme Court 
broadly applied a criminal law prohibiting the publication of seditious statements.16S It 
also held that the Constitution did not invalidate a provision of the Criminal Code 
making it illegal to publish false news likely to cause fear and alarm to the public. l64 
Contrary to the practice in the United States, the Nigerian courts presumed that legis-
lative acts which abridged fundamental rights were constitutional, were necessary, and 
reasonably justifiable. 165 The burden was thus placed on the individual to show that the 
law was unnecessary to the public interest and excessive to the object sought.166 
156 See Seng, supra note 4, at 123-25. The Southern Protectorate covered most of what is now 
southeastern Nigeria and Lagos. 
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When the military took over in 1966, it reaffirmed by Decree the basic provisions 
in the 1963 Constitution concerning the judiciary and fundamental rights. 167 In Lakanmi 
v. Attorney General,I6B the Supreme Court considered the nature of the military coup and 
its effect upon the judiciary's role as a protector of fundamental liberties. The Court 
rejected the argument that the military coup had destroyed the existing legal order. 
Rather, the Court found that the civilian government had handed power over to the 
military under the doctrine of necessity.16g The Court held that the military was required 
to respect the fundamental liberties of Nigerians and that the judiciary retained the 
power to see that those liberties were secured. It also invalidated Decree No. 45 which 
had purported to prohibit the courts from assuming jurisdiction over the Lakanmi matter. 
The military responded to this decision by decreeing that the coup did abrogate the 
existing legal order and that any judicial decision which purported to invalidate any 
decree or edict was null and void. 17O 
The 1979 Constitution attempted to codify the Lakanmi exposition of the judiciary's 
role as a protector of fundamental rights. It explicitly recognized the power of judicial 
review and prohibited the legislature from enacting any law that ousted or purported 
to oust the courts of jurisdiction. l7l The Constitution also purported to prohibit anyone 
from assuming power in Nigeria except in accordance with the provisions of the Con-
stitution. 172 
During the period of the Second Republic the courts generally did not shirk their 
responsibility of declaring laws in violation of the Constitution void. m In the press area, 
the courts upheld broad privileges for reporters l74 and indicated that the strict law of 
seditious libel as formerly applied did not conform to constitutional requirements. m 
Perhaps most importantly, there was some indication that the courts would not apply 
the strict standing requirements imposed by American courts to defeat the ability of 
citizens to litigate constitutional questions. 176 The courts also held that compensatory and 
167 Decree No.1 (Constitutional Suspension and Modification) (1966). 
168 [1971] 1 U.I.L.R. 20l. The case involved the legality of a decree which divested persons of 
their property without a judicial hearing. 
169 The military assumed power following an unsuccessful coup by a group of junior military 
officers. The country was in disarray and the acting president, following a meeting with a number 
of politicians and military leaders, went on the radio and announced that he was handing the 
country over to the military. The court noted that this handover was an "interim" measure designed 
to protect "lives and property and maintain law and order." Lakanmi, 1 U.I.L.R. at 217. 
170 Decree No. 28 (1970). 
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the courts than does the Constitution of the United States. See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 
506 (1868). 
172 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 1(2) (1979). 
175 See, e.g., Bendel State v. The Federation, [1982]3 N.C.L.R. 1; Archbishop Okogie v. Attorney 
General Lagos State, [1981]1 N.C.L.R. 218, afl'd [1981] 2 N.C.L.R. 337 (Fed. Ct. App.: Lagos). 
174 Monoh v. Senate of the National Assembly, [1981]1 N.C.L.R. 105 (High Ct.: Lagos). 
175 Chief Arthur Nwanko v. The State FCAlEl111183 (Fed. Ct. App.: Enugu, 7/27/83). 
176 See Adesanya v. President of the Republic, [1981] 2 N .C.L.R. 358, where the Supreme Court 
held that a Senator had no standing to challenge a presidential appointment which had also been 
confirmed by the Senate. In the course of his opinion, Chief Justice Fatayi-Williams noted: 
With these observations in mind, I take significant cognizance of the fact that Nigeria 
is a developing country with a multi-ethnic society and a written Federal Constitution, 
where rumour-mongering is the pastime of the market places and the construction 
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punitive damages could be awarded against officials who violated constitutional rights. 177 
However, a lower court did find that governmental agencies themselves were protected 
from damages, although not from declaratory judgments, by the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and that supervisors could not be held liable for damages on a doctrine of 
respondeat superior for the acts of their subordinates. 178 
When the military reassumed power in Nigeria in 1984, it did so despite the clear 
prohibition against such a maneuver in the 1979 Constitution. I79 Thus, unlike the 1966 
coup, no one could seriously question whether the edicts and decrees of the military 
authorities were superior to the 1979 Constitution. A suit contesting the detention of 
some of the former politicians was summarily dismissed,lso and Decree No.4 specifically 
prohibited judicial review of the special tribunal instituted to try journalists who printed 
false matters or who ridiculed any public officer. lSI 
sites. To deny any member of such a society who is aware or believes, or is led to 
believe, that there has been an infraction of any of the provisions of our Constitution, 
or that any law passed by any of our Legislative Houses, whether Federal or State, is 
unconstitutional, access to a Court of Law to air his grievance on the flimsy excuse of 
lack of sufficient interest is to provide a ready recipe for organized disenchantment 
with the judicial process. 
The framers of our 1979 Constitution had all these factors in mind by providing 
for the many checks and balances which appear therein. In fact, a close scrutiny of its 
very detailed provisions will convince anyone that reliance on the decisions, whether 
British, Canadian, Australian, or American, given in a different social and political 
context will only lead to restrictive rules of locus standi which, in the interest of the 
need for total compliance with the provisions of our Constitution, I find it difficult to 
accept or countenance. As a matter of fact, what can be discerned from the cases to 
which we are referred and, indeed, to other cases, is this. The Canadian Supreme 
Court now takes a liberal view of locus standi; so do the Australian High Court and 
the Court of Appeal in England presided over by Lord Denning. The House of Lords, 
on the other hand, takes a more restrictive view. Of course, England does not have a 
written Constitution. 
In view of the scantiness of the language of the American Constitution when 
compared with ours, and the great opportunities thereby offered to use the American 
courts for expounding the intentions of the founding fathers through its interpretation 
one is not surprised that the American courts were so inundated with legal proceedings 
that access to court had to be restricted through the use of the rules, formulated by 
the courts themselves, as to the locus standi of a plaintiff. 
In the Nigerian context, it is better to allow a party to go to court and to be heard 
than to refuse him access to our courts. Non-access, to my mind, will stimulate the 
freefor-all in the media as to which law is constitutional and which law is not! In any 
case, our courts have inherent powers to deal with vexatious litigants or frivolous 
claims. To re-echo the words of Learned Hand, if we are to keep our democracy, 
there must be one commandment - thou shall not ration justice. 
Id. at 373. 
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The provisions of the 1979 Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of the pressl8• 
and enunciating the fundamental objective that the press should be free so as to hold 
the government responsible and accountable to the peoplel8' were retained.184 However, 
the provisions that laws inconsistent with the Constitution were voidl85 and that the 
courts could not be ousted of jurisdiction to decide constitutional questionsl86 were 
suspended.187 Thus it would appear that even though the Constitution continues to 
protect a free press in Nigeria, the military does not have to worry about any judicial 
opposition should it decide to proceed to redefine the press's role. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In many ways the view of the Buhari regime on the role of a free press was 
schizophrenic. It stressed the role of the press in providing positive reinforcement for 
development and for government policies. At the same time, it also noted the role of 
the press as a watchdog against government excesses, so long as it printed the truth, and 
the role of the press in apprising the government of public opinion. 188 The rhetoric 
made some sense if the government were trying to rid the press of unbridled sensation-
alism and inaccuracies. However, the freeze on government information which prevented 
the press from investigating its stories seemed to conflict with that theory. Furthermore, 
the draconian way the government implemented Decree No.4 seemed to belie any 
benevolent purpose. The government's chief aim appeared to be to shield thin-skinned 
military men from criticism, which undercut the watchdog role for the press. 
Previous governments had tried on occasion to restrict the access of foreign corre-
spondents to Nigeria,189 but this was not an immediate concern during the Buhari regime 
because so little Western coverage was given to Nigeria. Nigerians themselves had access 
to VOA and BBC and to some Western magazines, although currency exchange prob-
lems limited the supply of Western magazines. For a time after the 1983 coup, Time and 
Newsweek were virtually unavailable for that reason. Thus, the real threat was to the 
indigenous media. If private newspapers could have been eliminated, then the govern-
ment-owned media would have been more easily brought under control. 
This process appears to have been checked by the overthrow of the Buhari govern-
ment and the installation of General Babangida as head of state. Despite the good 
intentions of the new government, Nigeria'S economic problems will not be easy to solve 
and pressures will remain to utilize every means at the government's disposal- including 
the press - to aid in the positive development of the country. 
182 Const. Fed. Rep. Nig. § 36 (1979). 
185Id. at § 21. 
184 Decree No.1 - Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree (1984). 
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186Id. at § 4(8). 
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188 New Nigerian, July 25, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (Head of State commenting that newspapers should 
engage in "Constructive" criticism); New Nigerian, July 14, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (Minister of Information 
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solutions); New Nigerian, June 12, 1981, at 1, col. 3 (Minister of Information commenting that 
press should "enlighten public services"). 
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In many ways a military government needs a free press as much as a civilian 
government does. A free press is one of the few channels under a military regime 
whereby the government receives feedback from the nation on the popularity of its 
policies and the civilian perspective. l90 In fact, one of the main reasons for the overthrow 
of the Buhari government may have been because of its failure to allow for criticism of 
its policies. 
At the present time the outcome of the struggle for a free press in Nigeria is still 
unresolved, but the prospects do appear more promising under the new regime. None-
theless, the pressure on the press to provide positive reinforcement for governmental 
policies will continue to be great in countries, like Nigeria, still struggling to achieve a 
national identity.191 In a country sharply divided along tribal or religious lines, an 
irresponsible press can greatly aggravate tensions and contribute to instability. The 
question therefore becomes whether the positive goals of developmental journalism can 
be implemented in a way that still respects the traditional freedom enjoyed by Western 
journalists from government viewpoint censorship. The strong history and basic values 
favoring press freedom in Nigeria may still enable that country to be a model for the 
rest of the Third World. One can hope that the basic tension between a libertarian and 
a developmental perspective will eventually create a balance that negates some of the 
more divisive aspects of Nigerian journalism while positively preserving the press' role 
as a watchdog and an independent conveyor of news and information. 
190 See Jakande, The Press and Military Rule, in NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT & POLITICS UNDER 
MILITARY RULE 113 (0. Oyediran ed. 1979). Cf E. NORDLINGER, supra note 149. This lesson has 
been learned by General Babangida. Before rejecting an IMF loan, he called for full public debate 
and has promised to do likewise on other major issues. This has not only insured the popularity of 
his decisions but has called one newspaper to dub the regime a "military democracy." New York 
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191 For instance, in December, 1983, twenty-one years of military dictatorship was ended in 
Brazil and a new democratic government installed. The press, which had been curtailed during the 
military era, immediately started to portray the newly established Congress "as crowded with lazy, 
overpaid and even corrupt politicians." Congressional leaders immediately countered that the 
journalists were "promoting a new coup by undermining democracy." New York Times, Sept. 29, 
1985, at 2E, col. 3. 
